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Who Owns Ocean Biodiversity?: 
The Legal Status and Role of 
Patents as a Means to Achieve 




The technological race to obtain genetic material from the ocean 
floors has been led by the economically advanced states of the global 
North. It has been a race for obtaining mineral resources among states, 
dominated by Inter-State competition for land, people and money. 
However, when the issue concerns mineral resources found in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), there is potential for either 
competition or cooperation among nation-states. Deep-sea mining and 
bioprospecting are particularly divisive. Very early on states recognised 
that this might lead to political tensions among them and so agreed to 
a standard that they would adhere to in their exploration and 
exploitation of these resources. This led to the creation of the ‘Common 
Heritage of Mankind’ principle. Although this agreement was reached 
in reference to mineral resources, the regulation of marine genetic 
resources (MGRs), particularly those mined from ABNJ, remains 
ungoverned. However, with the increasing incidence of ocean 
exploration, the use of these resources have exposed three gaps within 
the global framework of access and benefit-sharing stemming from the 
international law, biodiversity law and intellectual property 
respectively.  
Starting under the premise of the public domain, resources are 
being appropriated under the absence of any applicable legal regime. 
Chapter I attempts to answer the question who owns biodiversity by 
identifying the regulatory gap within the Law of the Sea. Chapter II 
addresses the regulatory gap under biodiversity law and identifies the 
problem of inefficiency within the current benefit-sharing framework. 
The question of whether the interlinking of the patent system and 
biodiversity law would alleviate this inefficiency is considered and three 
hindrances to such an argument are identified. Chapter III considers 
academic, political and stakeholder opinion on these issues by taking 
into account international and transnational law. This thorough 
analysis indicated that patent law has thus far been unable to lead to 
 
* Abhaya is an LLM Candidate at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. She has an interest in public international law and 
dispute resolution.  
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an effective and efficient solution. This paper then takes into account 
the existing political and stakeholder conflicts surrounding the 
maximisation of economic value that have so far hindered the process 
of reaching an efficient solution at the international arena. The author 
proposes that the ‘nondominium’ principle could prove to be an 
effective solution and potentially pave the way to incentivise user 
countries to innovate without private appropriation of rights through 
patents. 
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In 1962, a green fluorescent protein, derived from a bioluminescent 
jellyfish, was found in the deep-sea.1 Drawing inspiration from their 
bright glow, in 2008, scientists won the Nobel Prize due to their 
discovery that the protein could be used as a biological highlighter to 
track the growth of cancerous cells.2 The ability of marine genetic 
resources (“MGRs”) to thrive in harsh conditions, for example in 
hydrothermal vents,3 has resulted in MGRs becoming indispensable for 
use in the field of medicine and for future research developments.4 This 
is a momentous example of MGRs’ value found in the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (“ABNJ”), and is a testament that future is here 
and must be regulated. Science has become more important than ever 
for development, with the UNESCO Declaration on Science and the 
Use of Scientific Knowledge acknowledging that this was even more so 
for developing countries.5 The pace of such unprecedented scientific 
advancement has increased MGRs’ significance and has created the 
need for equitable distribution of benefits arising from its derivatives.6 
The bioprospecting process, defined as the “scientific investigation of 
living organisms for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical 
resources,” includes the research, collection and utilization of genetic 
resources.7 While exploiting genetic resources, signatories are obligated 
to follow the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”),8 where they 
have committed to the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
 
1. MARC ZIMMER, ILLUMINATING DISEASE: AN INTRODUCTION TO GREEN 
FLUORESCENT PROTEINS 1 (2015). 
2. Id. at 15–17. 
3. Serge Beslier, The Protection and Sustainable Exploitation of Genetic 
Resources of the High Seas from the European Union’s Perspective, 24 
INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 333, 334 (2009).  
4. Angelica Bonfanti & Seline Trevisanut, TRIPS on the High Seas: 
Intellectual Property Rights on Marine Genetic Resources, 37 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 187, 188 (2011). 
5. Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge, ¶ 34, 
UNESCO (July 1, 1999), 
http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/declaration_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/N7VV-2KAX]. 
6. See Beslier, supra note 3, at 334, 336–39. 
7. JOANNA MOSSOP, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL 
MILES 111 (2016). 
8. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 
[hereinafter CBD]. 
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out of the utilization of genetic resources.”9 Although the ABNJ, 
comprising of the high seas and the surrounding area, is open to all and 
cannot be appropriated,10 few countries have the economic resources 
and technical capability to conduct bioprospecting to obtain these 
resources.11 However, most sampling is conducted in developing tropical 
countries.12 This has led to unequitable distribution, which—alongside 
the emerging issues surrounding intellectual property protection offered 
to such discoveries and inventions—has given rise to discussions in both 
academic and international fora.13 These discussions stem from the 
regulatory gap of MGRs within the ABNJ left in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas (“UNCLOS”) and the 1994 
Implementation Agreement.14 Further, the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from Their Utilization (“Nagoya Protocol”)15 of the CBD failed 
to acknowledge the similar necessity to regulate the access and benefit-
sharing of MGRs beyond national jurisdictions.16 For more than a 
decade the international community has expressed differing viewpoints 
on this issue,17 but the question remains: how do we close such gaps in 
practice without hampering scientific research in the future? 
Currently, MGRs are tested to treat chronic pain and asthma.18 
They are also comprised of 11% of the gene bank, per a 2017 study.19 
 
9. Id. at art. 1. 
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 136 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
11. See Rachel Wynberg, Marine Genetic Resources and Bioprospecting in 
the Western Indian Ocean, in REG’L STATE OF THE COAST REP. 407, 
409 (José Paula ed., 2015).  
12. Id. 
13. See id. at 412. 
14. G.A. Res. 48/263, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 (Aug. 17, 1994). 
15. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol]. 
16. Beslier, supra note 3, at 337. 
17. Id. at 339–40. 
18. Kevin Krajick, Medicine from the Sea, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 30, 2004), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/medicine-from-the-
sea-99586066/ [https://perma.cc/C8AZ-69S8]. 
19. Robert Blasiak et al., Corporate Control and Global Governance of 
Marine Genetic Resources, 4 SCIENCE ADVANCES 1, 2 (2018). 
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For the law to remain effective, it must respond to the growing 
significance of MGRs and avoid remaining incomplete.20 To address this 
advancement, on June 19, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a resolution to “develop an internationally legally binding 
instrument” (“ILBI”) on UNCLOS to address biodiversity in areas 
beyond its national jurisdiction.21 However, a number of actors—states, 
industrial stakeholders, and academics—influence the speed and 
direction of such an evolutionary process.22 The focus of this paper is 
to identify the most efficient method to facilitate fair and equitable 
distribution and thus reduce the gap between states of the Global North 
and of the South.  
The complex nature of this legal issue results from two regulatory 
gaps in science and technology. The first is within the international law 
of the sea, and the second is within biodiversity law.  
UNCLOS splits the ocean into different maritime zones and 
regulates the activities that can be conducted within these areas.23 This 
division of the maritime zones has resulted in MGRs’ ambiguous legal 
status in the ABNJ and a disagreement on whether the ABNJ is subject 
to the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind (“CHM”) or to 
the freedom of the high seas.24 Broadly, the CHM principle recognizes 
that users must not appropriate the resources; the resources must 
remain accessible to all, and the benefits must be shared equitably.25 
Alternatively, the freedom of the high seas envisages a free market 
situation where property can be used for individual benefit and claimed 
on a “first-come-first-served” basis.26 
The second is the efficiency of the ABS framework itself and the 
granting of patents to these inventions. Recently, the workability of the 
ABS framework in the light of technological advances came into 
question.27 Further, patents leading to exclusive rights have been 
identified as a hindrance to equitable distribution and scientific 
 
20. See Wynberg, supra note 11, at 414. 
21. G.A. Res. 69/292, Development of an International Legally Binding 
Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity 
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2015). 
22. See Beslier, supra note 3, at 338–39. 
23. See UNCLOS, supra note 10. 
24. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 4. 
25. See generally E.D. Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus Common 
Heritage of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO 
L. R. 521 (1983).  
26. Id. 
27. MANUEL RUIZ MULLER, ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND 
BENEFIT-SHARING 25 YEARS ON: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 2 (2018). 
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advancement.28 In addressing these two concerns, this paper aims to 
formulate a solution that maximizes benefits by incentivizing 
innovation as well as allowing these benefits to reach downstream users.  
Through the lens of the development agenda, this paper seeks to 
answer the research question of whether patents can be designed in a 
way that maximizes the benefits to be distributed. Section I addresses 
the legal status of the MGRs found in the ABNJ. Then, Section II 
examines the effective working of the ABS framework so far and the 
patentability of genetic material. Specifically, it will identify the role of 
patents within this framework. Section III discusses the possible 
solutions proposed by academics and states at different conferences. 
Finally, it will be evaluated whether these solutions help reach the 
result of equitable distribution in the last section. It is suggested that 
given the political tensions and irreconcilability, the effective solution 
may not lie in patents and ABS, but instead in “nondominium” or 
trusteeship principles. 
I.  Legal Status of the ABNJ and Policy 
Background 
Before delving into the equitable distribution of benefits, it is 
important to gain a better understanding of where MGRs are found 
within the ABNJ, and how they are placed within the existing legal 
regime. This section will first define the ABNJ in legal terms. Then, 
having identified the existing regulatory gap, this section will address 
the possible solutions to resolve this issue. Finally, it will evaluate these 
solutions, keeping in mind the concerns of the stakeholder, to identify 
the appropriate legal status that would forge a path towards equitable 
distribution and development.  
A. The Regulatory Gap — Access and Benefit Sharing of MGRs 
beyond national jurisdiction 
A unique characteristic of MGRs found within the ABNJ is that 
these oceanic regions do not fall under the jurisdiction of any one 
state.29 Therefore, the resources found in such an area are not the 
property of any one state.30 As the present discussions concern genetic 
material found in this area, the question of their legal status is more 
complex. Three main legal instruments contribute to the legal regime: 
the UNCLOS,31 the CBD,32 and the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
 
28. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 4. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. UNCLOS, supra note 10. 
32. CBD, supra note 8. 
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Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”).33 One pillar of these three instruments 
is the recognition of the State’s sovereign rights on the genetic resources 
that reside within their territory.34 These rights apply to genetic 
resources found within national jurisdictions.35  
1. The UNCLOS and MGRs Common Heritage of Mankind vs 
Freedom of the High Seas 
The ABNJ consists of the seabed, the ocean floor and subsoil, and 
the high seas.36 The high seas stretch beyond the Exclusive Economic 
Zone,37 the territorial and internal waters of states, and extend to the 
geomorphological limits of the ocean.38 Although the UNCLOS 
mentions the mineral resources found within the ABNJ,39 it makes no 
mention of the genetic resources and activities such as marine 
bioprospecting.40 These concepts were not envisioned at the time of 
drafting in 1982.41 Even so, the UNCLOS remains relevant to our 
discussion because it is known as the constitution of the oceans and is 
concerned with the regulation of all activities carried out in the oceans 
and the seas.42  
While the Area43 and the water column44 are governed by two 
different regimes, MGRs can be found in both.45 Part XI of the 
UNCLOS regulates the seabed and deems it to be the common heritage 
 
33. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IV 
¶¶ 5–6, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 156 [hereinafter TRIPS] 
(establishing oversight over intellectual property).  
34. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 3; Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 6 ¶ 
1. 
35. Id. 
36. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 1(1). 
37. See id. at art. 76. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at art. 77. 
40. See generally id. 
41. Hauiwen He, Limitations on Patenting Inventions Based on Marine 
Genetic Resources, 29 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 521, 523 
(2014). 
42. G.A. Res. 65/37, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
43. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 1(1). 
44. Charlotte Salpin & Valentina Germani, Patenting of Research Results 
Related to Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 
The Crossroads of the Law of the Sea and Intellectual Property Law, 16 
REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T. L. 12, 15–16 (2007). 
45. He, supra note 41, at 522. 
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of mankind.46 Specifically, Articles 136 and 137 provide that no State 
shall claim to have sovereign rights over these resources, and that the 
activities in the Area should be carried out for the benefit of all 
mankind47 and regulated by the International Seabed Authority.48 
However, Part VII of the UNCLOS establishes that the water column 
beyond national jurisdiction is open to all states and is subject to the 
freedom of the high seas.49 These freedoms include navigation and 
fishing, but they are restricted as a result of the due regard given to 
other states.50  
Currently, marine bioprospecting is carried out under the principle 
of marine scientific research enshrined in Part XIII of the UNCLOS.51 
This principle generally governs research within the ABNJ, but is once 
again restricted by the due regard given to the rights of other states.52 
The UNCLOS specifically states that such scientific research shall not 
give rise to any legal claims to any part of the marine environment or 
its resources.53 Further, States are required to promote the transfer of 
knowledge and flow of scientific data resulting from such research.54 
Additionally, scientific research in the Area is required to be conducted 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole.55 This stipulates that States have 
to act in aid of international cooperation, in scientific research, and the 
transfer of technology, particularly to developing states.56  
This distinction leads to a fundamental problem when applying the 
UNCLOS to MGRs; it is uncertain which framework would apply57 
because their origin is not ascertainable.58 If the research is carried out 
 
46. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 136. 
47. Id. at arts. 136, 137. 
48. Id. at art. 137 (2). 
49. Id. at art. 87.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. at art. 143. 
52. Id. at art. 238. 
53. Id. at art. 241; Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, Marine Scientific Research 
Activities as the Legal Basis for Intellectual Property Claims?, 22 MARINE 
POL’Y 337, 342 (1998).  
54. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 244.  
55. Id. at art. 143(1). 
56. Id. at art. 144. 
57. U.N. GAOR, Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the 
Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/63/79 (May 16, 2008) [hereinafter A/63/79]. 
58. Bonfanti & Trevisanut, supra note 4, at 193. 
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in the Area, it obligates the States sponsoring such activities to conduct 
due diligence and remain answerable to the International Seabed 
Authority.59 Further, they would be liable for damages if they failed to 
comply.60 Moreover, States would have to ensure that the research was 
being conducted for the benefit of all mankind and show the equitable 
distribution of benefits.61 On the other hand, if the research was 
conducted in the water column, the obligations placed on States to 
ensure transfer of knowledge has a significantly less rigorous standard.62 
The States would be free to access the MGRs within the ABNJ to 
conduct marine bioprospecting and to do so without obligation to 
ensure public availability of information or to distribute benefits among 
developing States.63 
2. Political Impasse — Diverging Opinion 
There is considerable disagreement as to whether the MGRs are the 
common heritage of mankind or whether the freedom of the high seas 
must apply.64 Although this regulatory gap has been identified 
previously65 and countries have put forth their diverging opinions, 
arguably stemming from their vested interests, no consensus on which 
regime must apply has yet been reached. 66 For instance, at the 2007 
UN Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 
several States reiterated their view that “all the resources of the Area, 
including marine genetic resources were the ‘common heritage of 
 
59. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 
U.N. Doc ISBA/17/C/6 (Mar. 4, 2011) (requesting an advisory opinion 
from the Seabed Disputes Chamber to the International Seabed Authority 
on matters relating to the responsibilities and obligations of sponsoring 
States).  
60. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 139(2). 
61. Compare id. at 139(2), with id. at arts. 140, 144.  
62. See id. at art. 87(2). 
63. CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF 
SINGAPORE, REPORT OF THE BBNJ WORKSHOP ON THE 
CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: PREPARING 
FOR THE PREPCOM 6 (2016) [hereinafter CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
LAW]. 
64. See generally id. 
65. U.N. Secretary General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 227, U.N. Doc. 
A/60/63/Add.1 (July 15, 2005).  
66. See id. ¶ 178. 
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mankind.’”67 Other delegations put forth a different view that these 
resources fell outside the ambit of the UNCLOS and only customary 
international law can apply.68 
Similar issues were raised at the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal 
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and the 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction,69 through the Preparatory Committee.70 Presently, the 
Inter-governmental Conference is negotiating the new legally binding 
instrument to apply to this regime.71 However, even the most recent 
discussion regarding this issue, the Second Session of the BBNJ 
Conference, did not seem to make any progress towards reaching a 
consensus.72  
3. The Legal Status  
As a result of the political impasse and the significance of the issue 
at hand, there has been a high level of academic engagement with this 
question.73 As this question is not the focus of this article, I only briefly 
touch on the arguments put forth by academics regarding which 
interpretation supports the development agenda. 
a. The Positive Approach — “As it is” 
The legal implication of the exclusion of genetic materials is 
debateable. Genetic resources were omitted from the initial discussions 
at the UNCLOS because it was then assumed that with the absence of 
sunlight on the ocean floor, living organisms did not inhabit it.74 
 
67. U.N. General Assembly, Report on the Work of the U.N. Open-Ended 
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its 
Eighth meeting, U.N. Doc. A/62/169, ¶ 71 (July 30, 2007). 
68. Id. ¶ 74.  
69. G.A. Res. 59/24, ¶ 73 (Nov. 17, 2005); U.N. General Assembly, Letter 
dated Mar. 16, 2010 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, ¶¶ 
71–72, U.N. Doc. A/65/68 (Mar. 17, 2010). 
70. G.A. Res. 69/292, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2015).  
71. See G.A. Dec. 74/543, U.N. Doc. A/74/L.41 (Mar. 9, 2020). 
72. Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding 
Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity 
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Statement by the President of the 
Conference at the Closing of the Third Session, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.232/2019/10 (Sept. 13, 2019) [hereinafter BBNJ Conference]. 
73. See, e.g., Beslier, supra note 3; Blasiak et al., supra note 19. 
74. CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 63, at 8. 
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However, today we know that a wide variety of organisms live near or 
at the seafloor of the Area.75  
Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
(“VCLT”)76 rule of general interpretation seems imperative to interpret 
the treaty provisions and will serve as the point of departure for this 
analysis. As the VCLT has repeatedly been referred to as customary 
international law by the International Court of Justice77 and the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea,78 its applicability here 
cannot be denied.  
Adopting a positive approach, Marciniak analyzed the legal 
implication of this omission by applying literal, teleological, and 
contextual interpretations.79 If a literal interpretation is applied, it 
could be argued that the UNCLOS does not extend to MGRs.80 
However, when a more functional approach is taken, it is required that 
the treaty be interpreted while keeping in mind its object or purpose,81 
usually set out in its preamble.82 Although the preamble of the 
UNCLOS acknowledges that “matters not regulated by this Convention 
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general 
international law,” it emphasizes the need for equitable and efficient 
utilization of the ocean’s resources.83 Bearing in mind that the goals of 
the convention “contribute to realising a ‘just’ and ‘equitable’ 
international economic order,”84 it can be argued that the achievement 
of this goal should be of paramount importance. Although this may not 
automatically call for the application of the CHM to the whole regime,85 
 
75. Id. 
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
77. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 
14 ¶ 65 (Apr. 20).  
78. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber), Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 2011, 
10 ¶ 57. 
79. Konrad Jan Marciniak, Marine Genetic Resources: Do They Form Part 
of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?, in NATURAL RESOURCES 
AND THE LAW ON THE SEA: EXPLORATION, ALLOCATION, 
EXPLOITATION OR NATURAL RESOURCES IN AREAS UNDER NATIONAL 
JURISDICTION AND BEYOND, 373, 384–385 (2017). 
80. U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 4 mtg. ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/62/169 (July 30, 2007). 
81. RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 209–11 (2nd ed. 2015). 
82. VCLT, supra note 76, at art. 31(2). 
83. UNCLOS, supra note 10, pmbl.  
84. Id. 
85. Marciniak, supra note 79, at 387. 
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it points to the fact that at least a few principles of the CHM should 
apply. 
A functional analysis of the VCLT’s Article 31(3) calls for an in-
depth interpretation of the travaux preparatoires and subsequent 
developments. However, this interpretation is subjective. Marciniak 
concludes that there was no basis to argue that the MGRs were ever 
included within the CHM principle.86 However, given the subjectivity 
of such an interpretation, others seem to disagree. In Correa’s opinion, 
the UNGA Resolution 25/2749, which declared that the Area and its 
resources were the common heritage of mankind and laid the basis for 
Part XI of the UNCLOS, was not limited to minerals.87 
From this brief analysis it appears that the application of Article 
31 of the VCLT may not lend itself to the argument that MGRs are 
effectively covered under Part XI of the UNCLOS in a strict legal sense. 
However, nothing would stop the conclusion of a supporting agreement 
that derived principles from the objectives of the UNCLOS. 
b. The Normative Approach — ‘As it should be’ 
While the new treaty is still being negotiated and the draft text is 
yet to be prepared,88 I argue that it is imperative to look at this question 
through the lens of “what ought to be.” Given the significance of this 
debate to the scientific advancement and the development agenda, this 
article will aim to achieve these objectives through the arguments raised 
and solutions proposed.  
The UNCLOS cannot be applied in isolation from other treaties 
and instruments of international law.89 Keeping this in mind, those 
applying Article 31 of the VCLT should keep in mind the wider 
objectives of the general body of international law. 
Furthering these objectives, an International Institute for 
Environment and Development (“IIED”) study90 argued that if we were 
 
86. Id. at 401.  
87. Carols M. Correa, Access to and Benefit Sharing of Marine Genetic 
Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction: Developing a New Legally 
Binding Instrument, 79 SOUTH CENTRE 1, 9 (Sept. 2017).  
88. See generally G.A. Dec. 74/543, supra note 71. 
89. See James Harrison, Reflections on the Role of International Courts and 
Tribunals in the Settlement of Environmental Disputes and the 
Development of International Environmental Law, 25 J. ENV’T L. 501, 
506 (2013) (explaining a matter where an adjudicatory body held treaty 
rules were not to be held in isolation from the rest of the body of public 
international law). 
90. Eleftheria Asimakopoulou & Essam Yassin Mohammad, Marine Genetic 
Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: A ‘Common Heritage 
of Mankind,’ IIED BRIEFING (2019). 
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to shift the lens of our analysis to the wider body of international law,91 
it can be seen that the international courts do not view the oceans in a 
similar manner.92  
For example, in South China Sea Arbitration, the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration was called upon to decide the Philippines’ challenge to 
maritime claims made by China.93 The Court recognized that the 
countries had a duty to preserve marine environment both within the 
national jurisdiction and without.94 This demonstrates that the division 
of the maritime zones as the high seas or the Area, and regulating them 
through the use of different legal regimes, is artificial.95 The courts do 
not adhere to these artificial zones in their interpretations, and as a 
result, these divisions are obsolete.96 These artificial divisions should 
not act to the detriment of the wider agenda of development and 
scientific advancement. This interpretation affirmed that other 
provisions within the treaty as well as the general corpus of 
international law could inform the core framework of the UNCLOS.97  
Further, the term “environment” under the UNCLOS was 
interpreted in light of the CBD definition of “ecosystem” as a “dynamic 
complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their 
non-living environment interacting as a functional unit.”98 In doing so, 
the Court incorporated the “ecosystem approach” into Part XII of the 
UNCLOS concerning the marine environment.99 As a result, living and 
non-living organisms in ABNJ are interconnected with their habitat, 
and form an indivisible ecosystem.100  
To apply this approach in practice requires uniform regulation of 
marine resources. As discussed, the CHM principle already applies to 
“any solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area, 
 
91. Id. at 2–3. 
92. Id. 
93. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, Case No. 2013-19, 
¶ 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
94. Id. at ¶¶ 940–941.  
95. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 2. 
96. Id. 
97. Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Interpretation of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS 
by the Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration: A Critique, 50 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 49, 56 (2019). 
98. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2. 
99. DUNCAN E.J. CYRRIE & MISCHA DAVIS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
RELEVANT TO MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL 
JURISDICTION SUBMISSION TO THE CHAIR (2016), 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/greenpeace.p
df [https://perma.cc/9Z2U-R97G].  
100. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2.  
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including polymetallic nodules.”101 Therefore, to achieve uniformity in 
the regulation of marine resources, the CHM must also apply to MGRs.  
Therefore, if we were to look at the issue of the legal status of 
MGRs within the ABNJ through this wider lens, it is possible to extend 
the interpretation of Part XI of the UNCLOS to MGRs. The case for 
basing the new instrument on the CHM principle can be made stronger 
if the interests of science and development are considered.  
4. In the Interest of Science and Development 
Further, the principle that certain areas are to be used for the 
benefit of all exists as a general principle of law even outside the scope 
of the UNCLOS.102 If a normative approach applied to Article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT, the general principles of international law, including this 
principle, could be included in this interpretation.  
The preamble of the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”) 
highlights that,  
the importance, for all the peoples of the world, of safeguarding 
this unique and irreplaceable [cultural and natural] property, to 
whatever people it may belong . . . considering that parts of the 
cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and 
therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of 
mankind as a whole.103 
Given that the exceptional habitats, sensitive and endangered 
species of the ABNJ are of outstanding universal value (“OUV”) as 
recognized under the WHC,104 it is likely to be regarded as world 
heritage. If the marine sites of the ABNJ are recognized as world 
heritage, then that further necessitates the theory that the benefits 
accruing from their exploitation or exploration should be shared by 
humanity as a whole.105  
This principle is also recognized by the ICJ. In his separate opinion, 
Judge Weeramantry acknowledged that the earth’s resources are “not 
individually, but collectively owned.”106 The principle of intra and inter-
generational equity was acknowledged in the well-known Nuclear 
 
101. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 133. 
102. Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes around Comes around: How UNCLOS 
Ratification Will Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 
7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 70 (2009). 
103. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. 
104. Id. 
105. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 3. 
106. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7, 107 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.). 
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Weapons Advisory Opinion.107 In recognizing that the environment 
“represents the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn,”108 the Court upheld the right of present and future generations 
to not only live in a healthy environment, but to also have its natural 
elements fairly and equitably shared.109 
The right to share in scientific advancement and its benefits is 
recognized in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”).110 Although the UDHR is not a legally binding 
instrument,111 academics have acknowledged that the provisions could 
evolve to form binding norms as customary international law.112 Even 
though the academics arguing that the UDHR is customary 
international law in toto are in the minority,113 it is still worth arguing 
because scientific advancement is indispensable to development.114 
In an indivisible ecosystem such as the ABNJ,115 applying the 
equitable distribution principles enshrined in the preamble of the 
UNCLOS can only be effectively realized through the applying the 
CHM principle. Moreover, developing countries likely could be excluded 
from both access and benefit-sharing of scientific research into MGRs 
without uniform regulation of scientific exploration regarding MGRs in 
ABNJ. That, by itself, would constitute a violation of the “human right 
to science” which includes the right to share in scientific advancement 
and its benefits.116 
While the UNCLOS omitted to include MGRs within its core 
framework,117 a new internationally binding instrument is being 
negotiated.118 However, even though this regulatory gap has been 
identified for some time now, it is still unclear which legal regime would 
 
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8).  
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 
(Dec. 10, 1948).  
111. Richard Pierre Claude & Bernardo W. Issel, Health, Medicine and Science 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 
126, 139. 
112. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 102. 
113. Hurst Huannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, 3 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS.144, 148 (1998). 
114. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 102. 
115. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 3. 
116. See, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 110, art. 27.  
117. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 1. 
118. Id. 
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apply.119 By briefly engaging with the implications of the application of 
the legal regimes on the development agenda, it is concluded that the 
application of CHM to the MGRs within the ABNJ would help achieve 
the most equitable solution.  
Acknowledging the lack of political consensus,120 this section aims 
to take the discussions further by briefly interpreting the treaty’s 
provisions. In doing so, I kept in mind the overarching objective of this 
article: to arrive at a solution that is in the best interest of scientific 
advancement and development. 
If the VCLT was applied in a narrow sense and with a positive 
approach, the freedom of the high seas would apply to the MGRs within 
the ABNJ. However, these interpretations are subjective and academic 
opinions differed when employing similar interpretations.121 Given the 
lack of academic consensus, this article adopts a normative approach 
to this legal analysis. By identifying the developments in other areas of 
international law and applying them to the issue at hand, this section 
identified that arguments for applying the CHM principle to the new 
instrument could be made through the viewpoints regarding the right 
to the science, inter and intra-generational equity, and world heritage.  
Therefore, although the lack of political consensus on the legal 
status of MGRs within the ABNJ poses a problem to the development 
agenda,122 the problem can be avoided by applying a normative 
approach to the legal analysis. Even though the question of the 
management of resources could also be discussed without any 
agreement on the legal status, this might result in the formulation of 
“a dependent and normatively incoherent governance regime.”123 The 
analysis of the most equitable solution will progress under the 
assumption that the CHM principle applies.  
 
119. See, Kogan, supra note 102, at 46. 
120. Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National 
Jurisdictions: Components of a Fair, Informed and Progressive 
Internationally Binding Legal Instrument, SSRN (2018) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215356 
[https://perma.cc/WC9T-9F4M]. 
121. See Chuxiao Yu, Implications of the UNCLOS Marine Scientific Research 
Regime for the Current Negotiations on Access and Benefit Sharing of 
Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 51 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 2, 5 (2019).  
122. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions, 
supra note 120. 
123. Id. 
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II.  The Role of Patents within the Access and 
Benefit-sharing Framework 
Building on the legal analysis above, this section seeks to address 
the second regulatory gap found in the biodiversity law, namely the 
access and benefit-sharing (“ABS”) of genetic resources originating 
beyond national jurisdiction. A central aim of this chapter is to analyze 
the role of patents within the ABS framework and how they can be 
designed more effectively and efficiently. First, this chapter will outline 
this regulatory gap within the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and 
identify the role of patents within the ABS framework. Then, the article 
outlines the requirements of patent protection for MGRs. Having placed 
the role and the nature of patent protection within the ABS, the 
chapter then identifies how each of these could hinder the delivery of 
benefits to all.  
A. The Regulatory Gap - Genetic Resources Beyond National 
Jurisdiction  
Much like the gap within the UNCLOS, the scientific inventions 
derived from MGRs within the ABNJ go unregulated in biodiversity 
law.124 This section will deal with the legal issues surrounding the CBD 
and TRIPS regarding the equitable distribution of these resources. 
1. Biodiversity Law and MGRs 
In 1992, the adoption of the CBD established a broad framework 
for member states to implement national laws directed at the 
conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of the components, and 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources.125 With 196 contracting parties,126 the CBD has become the 
main framework used by the international community to protect 
against the loss of biodiversity.127 Sovereignty, prior informed consent 
(“PIC”) and mutually agreed terms (“MAT”) have become the tools to 
ensure the benefit-sharing.128 
 
124. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 1. 
125. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 1. 
126. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VW9W-DS6U].  
127. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, OCEAN HEALTH INDEX, 
http://www.oceanhealthindex.org/methodology/components/convention
-on-biological-diversity [https://perma.cc/47SE-LRLR].  
128. MULLER, supra note 27, at 4.  
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The Nagoya Protocol was adopted to clarify and strengthen the 
benefit-sharing laid down in the CBD.129 It aimed to do so by 
facilitating the sharing of benefits in a fair and equitable manner by 
establishing a transnational Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House 
(“ABS Clearing House”).130 Both the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
recognize “mutually agreed terms” that provide that specific access and 
benefit-sharing conditions must be agreed upon by users and providers 
of genetic resources.131 The Nagoya Protocol also establishes the 
issuance of internationally recognized certificates by the relevant 
national authority, which certify that a genetic resource has been 
obtained, accessed, and used per prior consent of the national authority 
having jurisdiction over the genetic resource.132 Where PIC is not 
possible, Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol calls for the establishment 
of the “global multi-lateral benefit sharing mechanism.”133 It states,  
Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations or for 
which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent.134 
The words “it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent”135 have been said to imply that the global multilateral 
mechanism includes MGRs within ABNJ.136 Although this provision 
appears to fill the gap identified in the UNCLOS above, the Preamble 
of the Nagoya Protocol reaffirms that it applies to “the sovereign rights 
of States over their natural resources and according to the provisions 
of the Convention.”137 Therefore, it would be difficult to interpret the 
 
129. See About the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/convention/ [https://perma.cc/X2C2-
X8DW].  
130. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 1; CBD, supra note 8, at art. 
18(3).  
131. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 18; CBD, supra note 8, at art. 15. 
132. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 17. 
133. Id. at art. 10. 
134. Id.  
135. Id.  
136. See, e.g., Su Jin Park, Changes in the Law of Marine Genetic Resources 
in the ABNJ and under the UNCLOS, in OCEAN LAW DEBATES: THE 
50-YEAR LEGACY AND EMERGING ISSUES 419, 420 (Harry N. Scheiber et 
al. eds., 2018).  
137. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, pmbl. 
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Nagoya Protocol as applying outside the boundaries of the CBD, whose 
jurisdictional scope only stretches within national jurisdictions.138 The 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol apply to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction in so much as the States are regulating the activities of 
their own nationals.139  
In areas beyond national jurisdiction, Article 5 of the CBD provides 
that States must cooperate directly with each other or through 
competent international organizations for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.140 The geographical coverage of 
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol once again leave the regulatory gap 
of access and benefit-sharing agreements for MGRs within ABNJ. 
2. Intellectual Property Rights, ABS frameworks and MGRs 
As MGRs originating from ABNJ are used to invent life-saving 
pharmaceuticals and biofuels,141 it is increasingly important to promote 
bioprospecting and innovation. Intellectual property protection, 
specifically patents, may help promote both. Patents provide timed 
exclusive rights to the creator in exchange for disclosure of information 
required to replicate the invention.142  
The CBD explicitly recognizes that IPRs may have an impact on 
the implementation of its objectives to the extent that they involve the 
assertion of private rights of ownership over biodiversity-generated 
innovations.143 In particular, intellectual property clauses may influence 
mutually agreed upon terms with regard to the utilization of genetic 
resources.144 But given the lack of clarity on the ABS framework 
 
138. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 4; see generally BEVIS FEDDER, MARINE 
GENETIC RESOURCES, ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING: LEGAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (2013). 
139. See generally Frédéric Jacquemont & Alejandro Caparrós, The Convenion 
on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Convention 10 Years After 
Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes?, 11 RECIEL 169 (2002).  
140. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 5.  
141. See, e.g., Marjo Vierros et al., Who Owns the Ocean? Policy Issues 
Surrounding Marine Genetic Resources, 25 LIMNOLOGY & 
OCEANOGRAPHY BULL. 29, 29–35 (2016).  
142. See Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ [https://perma.cc/8WYS-SH8A].  
143. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 1; Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at arts. 1, 
15. 
144. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ISSUES IN ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 10 (2018). 
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applicable to MGRs within ABNJ,145 the intellectual property 
protection for these resources remains unregulated.  
However, before considering the overall impact of patents within 
the ABS framework, it is imperative to discuss the requirements for the 
patentability of inventions derived from MGRs.  
3. Patentability of MGR-based inventions and processes 
A patent is an “exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a 
product or a process that offers a new technical solution to a problem 
or provides a new way of doing something.”146 At the outset, it seems 
the exclusive rights granted under patents principally clash with the 
CHM principle. However, after much academic debate, there is a broad 
consensus that no conceptual conflict exists between the UNCLOS 
provisions on marine scientific research and the objectives of intellectual 
property protection.147 They are both founded on the belief that 
universality of scientific knowledge is a foundation for the advancement 
of mankind.148  
Once a patent is secured, it gives the patent owner the exclusive 
right to prevent others from commercially exploiting the patented 
invention for the period in which the invention is protected.149 Patent 
rights are subject to territoriality, thus a patent needs to be sought 
distinctly in each country or region.150 For example, the European 
Patent Convention (“EPC”) only applies to the patents registered 
within the territory of each contracting State.151 Although granted by 
sovereign States, the basic pre-requisites to obtain a patent have 
 
145. GLEN WRIGHT ET AL., THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: NEGOTIATING 
A TREATY FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE 
BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 34 (2016), 
https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-31928-iddri-
haute-mer.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM77-LVTX].  
146. Patents, supra note 142.  
147. See Eve Heafey, Access and Benefit Sharing of Marine Genetic Resources 
from Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Intellectual Property – Friend, 
Not Foe, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 498 (2014); He, supra note 41, 527–30; 
Salpin & Germani, supra note 44.  
148. See, e.g., Dana Dalrymple, Scientific Knowledge as a Global Public Good: 
Contributions to Innovation and the Economy, in THE ROLE OF 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 35, 36 (2003); UNCLOS, supra 
note 10, pmbl.  
149. See Patents, supra note 142.  
150. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 144, at 28. 
151. European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.  
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reached harmonization.152 This is largely a result of international trade. 
The main requirements can be identified as being: novelty, inventive 
step, and industrial utility.153  
a. Novelty, Inventive Step and Industrial Application 
TRIPS requires patents be available for inventions in “all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application.”154 These requirements need to be 
fulfilled for a grant of a patent application.155 First, novelty refers to an 
invention possessing a novel characteristic that is not present in the 
existing body of knowledge, termed as “prior art.”156 With regard to 
MGRs found in the ABNJ, this requirement should be relatively easy 
to satisfy because marine bioprospecting for these resources is still at 
the nascent stages.157 However, for genetic material, the second 
requirement of an inventive step may be the deciding factor. Intellectual 
property refers to creations of the mind, like inventions, literary and 
artistic works, as well as designs, symbols, names and images used for 
commercial purposes.158 The invention must have an inventive or non-
obvious step that an ordinary person with reasonable skill could not 
have come up with.159 Mere discovery of a living organism that occurs 
in nature is not eligible for patent protection.160 Therefore, marine life 
 
152. See, e.g., Suma Athreye, Lucia Piscitello, & Kenneth C. Shadlen, Twenty-
Five Years since TRIPS: Patent Policy and International Business, 13 J. 
INT’L BUS. POL’Y. 315, 316 (2020).  
153. Conditions for a Patent, SWEDISH INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, 
https://www.prv.se/en/patents/applying-for-a-patent/before-the-
application/conditions-for-a-patent/ [https://perma.cc/EZX6-MUUT].  
154. TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27.  
155. See id.  
156. Jeffrey M. Kaden, Patent Protection and the Novelty Requirement, 
GOTTLIEB, RACKMAN, & REISMAN, P.C., 
https://grr.com/publications/patent-protection-novelty-requirement/ 
[https://perma.cc/M36A-KQSQ].  
157. See, e.g., GLEN WRIGHT ET AL., THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD 




158. What is Intellectual Property? WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo. int/about-ip/en/ [https://perma.cc/S383-WZYY]. 
159. TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27.  
160. See Jake Mace, Can a Living Organism be Patented? The Quick Answer 
is “Sometimes”, IP WIRE (July 31, 2017), 
http://ipwire.com/stories/patentability-living-organisms/ 
[https://perma.cc/N4L8-9DP5]. 
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forms and access to MGRs may not themselves be patented.161 
Regarding derivatives of these organisms or genetically modified 
organisms, national laws differ.162 Essentially, they need to be subject 
to human intervention but the degree of intervention varies between 
jurisdictions.163  
In the European Union (“EU”), inventions stemming from genetic 
material could be considered patentable inventions if they are isolated 
from their natural environments or produced by a technological 
process.164 In the United States (“US”), patenting genetic material is 
more stringent following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Association of 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc.165 which stated that 
merely isolating DNA was not enough to fulfil the novelty 
requirement.166 However, this added hurdle is not insurmountable. It is 
quite simple for businesses to derive DNA from the genetic material 
which remains patentable.167 
On the other hand, in the case of genetic material there may be 
ethical implications to consider. Patent applications under the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) are subject to cultural and moral 
considerations, termed ordre public.168 So, although derivations of 
genetic material are patentable, applications will only be granted if the 
derivatives do not offend public morality.169  
To comply with the first two requirements of “novelty” and 
“inventive step,” it is important not to disclose technical information 
 
161. Kristen E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak 
Future for Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Consultative Process on Marine Genetic 
Resources, 5 LOY. INT’L L. REV. 151, 159 (2008).  
162. See e.g., Alice Yuen-Ting Wong & Albert Wai-Kit Chan, Genetically 
modified foods in China and the United States: A primer of regulation 
and intellectual property protection, 5 FOOD SCI. & HUM. WELLNESS 124 
(2016); Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third 
Dimension of GMO Regulation, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 257 (2007).  
163. See generally Jan Holthuis & Marc van der Velden et al., Plant variety 
rights versus plant patents: legal developments and frictions in a regional 
perspective, 20 BUS. L. INT’L 96 (2019).  
164. Council Directive 98/44, arts. 20 & 21, 1998 O.J. (L.213) 13. 
165. Assn. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc. 569 U.S. 576 
(2013). 
166. Id. at 18.  
167. See Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Alice and Something More: The Drift 
Towards European Patent Jurisprudence, 3 J. L. BIOSCIENCE 693 (2016). 
168. Council Directive 98/44, art. 36, 1998 O.J. (L.213) 13. 
169. Id. at art. 37. 
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about the invention before submitting the patent application.170 
However, the technical information about the invention must be 
disclosed to the public in a patent application, which then becomes a 
valuable source of information for inventors, enterprises, and 
researchers.171 This early disclosure of information may prejudice a later 
patent application, particularly regarding MGRs—which will be 
discussed in a later section of this Chapter.  
Finally, the invention must also be capable of industrial application 
and do more than further a theoretical purpose.172 This requirement 
may pose a significant hurdle to patents for MGR-based inventions. As 
the end-to-end process of bioprospecting for genetic material can take 
years with very few MGRs progressing to the clinical trial stage,173 
industrial application can only be achieved at the end. Therefore, there 
is not an adequate incentive to conduct marine scientific research 
through the current patent regime.  
b. The impact of patents on the ABS Framework  
Now that this paper discussed the prerequisites for the patentability 
of MGRs within the ABNJ, it is essential to analyze the impact of 
patents on the efficiency of the ABS framework to effectively answer 
the research question. As mentioned earlier, while the granting of 
patents has an impact on the implementation of the CBD’s objective 
of equitable distribution,174 it remains unclear what the impact would 
be.  
Many States have expressed their concerns regarding intellectual 
property claims over inventions derived from MGRs within ABNJ.175 
These States generally fear that granting IPRs to these discoveries may 
result in less knowledge available to the public.176 On the other hand, 
some States insist that restricting the intellectual property regime 
regarding MGRs will decrease incentives for investments, thereby 
stifling research and development in this field and depriving the public 
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of valuable advancements.177 In essence, to arrive at the best possible 
solution, the regime should provide incentives to continue discovering 
the mysteries of the ABNJ while ensuring a fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits of the research.178 
Article 16(5) of the CBD requires member States to cooperate in 
this regard subject to national legislations and international law; this 
ensures that such rights are supportive and do not run counter to its 
objectives.179 Therefore, it is essential that the concerns regarding 
intellectual property claims over inventions derived from MGRs within 
ABNJ are addressed at the BBNJ.  
Further, in recent years, the ABS framework and its core premise 
of sharing the benefits that arise from utilization have come into 
question.180 Keeping this in mind, and the concerns raised by the States, 
this article considers whether patents will hinder or help the delivery of 
benefits to all.  
4. Effectively using Patents to Improve the Efficiency of the ABS 
Framework 
Within international law, benefit-sharing is used to imply an 
international obligation, a treaty objective, a right, a mechanism or a 
safeguard.181 There is no single definition of the concept and it is yet to 
be fully developed or become satisfactorily operational.182 However, 
even to the extent that it has been put into practice, it has not been 
the success that it was touted to be and rarely reaches its objectives.183  
With reference to developing technology in the research and 
development process of genetic resources, Muller identified 
shortcomings within the ABS framework.184 Muller’s 2018 study 
identifies that limitations of the ABS framework persist and almost no 
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monetary benefits are shared among users and providers.185 To remain 
effective, the ABS framework must accommodate the realities of 
research and development and catch up with technological advances.186 
Muller’s study conducts a qualitative assessment on ABS by examining 
the shifting interests of stakeholders.187 It highlights a noticeable 
imbalance between high investments in ABS and the relatively low 
returns and results.188 It unearthed the underlying inefficiency issues in 
an ABS regime that relies on contracts to capture fair and equitable 
benefits.189 The empirical study also identified that in the last two 
decades, the investment in ABS has reduced and the monetary benefits 
derived from it have “flatlined.”190 Thus, the only true indicators of 
economic value are gleaned from products that reach the market.191  
Further, the difficultly in quantifying non-monetary benefits has 
rendered benefit-sharing a mere tick-boxing exercise, where the users 
merely must claim these benefits have been shared.192 Non-monetary 
benefits can be in the form of jobs created, technical assistance, etc.193 
They are generated as part of more traditional research cooperation 
between countries and institutions.194 
In summary, both a lack of monetary benefits and the difficulty in 
tracing the non-monetary benefits explain to the inefficiency of the ABS 
Framework. Notably, this difficulty in tracing non-monetary benefits 
makes the monitoring of monetary benefits even more important. 
Professor Thambisetty proposes that such monitoring is only possible 
if we link international biodiversity law with the patent system.195 So 
far, this theory has been avoided because users would be forced to share 
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monetary benefits.196 However, this interlinking is important to note 
because it shows that patents could be used not only to monitor 
monetary benefits, but also to increase them. This final section 
identifies the technical and legal requirements that might hinder such 
an interlinking.  
B. Hindrances to the Interlinking of the Patent System and 
International Biodiversity Law 
In the years leading up to the recent conferences, academics and 
experts identified three distinct problems with intellectual property 
rights and MGRs.197 These problems include identification of loopholes 
within digital sequencing information (“DSI”), disclosure of origin 
(“DOO”) requirements, and corporate control of intellectual 
properties.198 Each of these factors will be examined with particular 
reference to MGRs, their values, and economic benefits.  
1. Disclosure of origin requirements  
Disclosure is a part of the core rationale of patent law—unless an 
invention is fully disclosed, the patent granted to the invention is 
invalid.199 Applicants may be required to disclose the invention, method 
of creation, any prior art, the true inventor, and the legal basis for the 
entitlement.200 However, currently neither the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty nor any other multilateral intellectual property mandates that 
countries impose a genetic resource DOO requirement in patent 
applications.201 Currently, such a requirement is solely a matter for 
national and regional law.202  
As identified above, the only true indicators of actual benefit 
accrued from MGRs are products that reach the market.203 However, 
with only the present disclosure requirements in place, it is nearly 
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impossible to look at products in the market and trace it back to 
MGRs.204 Strict confidentiality clauses protecting market-related data 
and a lack of adequate methodological transparency in commercial 
disclosure have contributed to this impossibility.205  
The existence of a mandatory DOO requirement is immaterial to 
patent applications because patent applications are only concerned with 
the origin of the invention.206 However, without such a requirement 
there is no easy way to ascertain whether the inventors are compliant 
with the applicable ABS regulations.207 Moreover, the benefits that 
could potentially accrue from this are likely going unmonitored.  
Therefore, a mandatory DOO requirement is imperative to the ABS 
framework, both for the creation of non-monetary benefits by displaying 
greater methodological transparency and for the monitoring of 
monetary benefits.  
2. Digital Sequence Information  
With advances in technology, genetic material and data are being 
deposited into GenBanks in digital form.208 This is termed as DSI.209 
Although there is no single definition, DSI contains information that 
originates from the analysis of the data contained in a digital file with 
a precise order of nucleotides, amino acids, or molecular structure of 
proteins.210 DSI is also capable of disclosing more information about 
genetic make-up, such as the evolutionary process leading to adaptation 
in the living organisms through DNA barcodes.211 At present, DSI, 
which is available as open-access data, goes unregulated or even 
unacknowledged by the CBD and Nagoya Protocol.212  
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A key reason for this relates to the definition of genetic resources 
under the CBD as being genetic material of actual or potential value, 
which has been interpreted as “matter.”213 From this, it follows that 
the intangible DSI cannot constitute genetic resources as defined by the 
CBD.214 At the time of the formulation of the CBD, ABS was intended 
to show the application of modern biotechnology by assessing the 
usefulness of genes and biochemicals, rather than accessing genetic 
resources.215 As technology advanced, it is possible that biotechnological 
R&D can potentially add a lot of value to the genetic resources. This 
narrow definition has also led to the obscuration of the true object of 
ABS: information, whether tangible or intangible.216  
This means that the user countries do not have to pay provider 
countries for the benefit just because the information consists of genetic 
sequence data.217 In 2019, Blasiak found that there has been an 
exponential increase in public databases of DSI.218 This in turn has 
roused the indignation of provider countries as they do not deem the 
benefit of public accessibility of the data to be enough to give up 
national patrimony.219 Therefore, this exclusion leaves valuable genetic 
sequences unregulated and contributes to the inefficiency of the ABS 
framework. 
3. Corporate Control  
One core component of the CHM principle is that all nations must 
share benefits amongst each other, fairly and equitably.220 Frakes has 
interpreted this to require restraining of profit-making activities of 
corporate entities.221 Therefore, one important measure of an efficient 
ABS regime for MGRs is if their benefits are shared and the profit-
making activities of corporations are curbed.  
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Blasiak found that nearly 84% of MGR patents are owned by 
companies.222 “Public and private universities accounted for another 
12%, while entities such as governmental bodies, individuals, hospitals, 
and non-profit research institutes registered the remaining 4%.”223 The 
world’s largest chemical manufacturer, German-based BASF, held 
nearly 47% of the patent sequences.224 The second and third largest 
companies were based in Japan and the US, respectively.225 Moreover, 
international patent claims have been made by entities in 30 countries 
and the EU, while the remaining 165 countries remain unrepresented.226  
Correa explicitly states that these are, by nature, international 
public goods; because of this nature, they should not be appropriated 
under private rights, such as patents, conferred by governments.227 It is 
further agreed that benefits accrued to private commercial concerns 
should be capped and efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits 
are shared between users and providers.228 Although patents are a timed 
protection, tying up these inventions for a period of 20 years could 
majorly hinder scientific progress.229  
However, given the high costs of marine bioprospecting,230 it is 
highly unlikely that corporations or other users would undertake this 
long process without the incentive of patents. If a more equitable 
solution is reached without compromising the incentive to innovate, it 
could potentially create more benefits that can be shared equitably.  
With that, three hindrances to the achievement of an effective ABS 
framework have been identified. Regarding DSI and DOO, the main 
argument between proponents and opponents is that inclusion of these 
requirements would help increase monetary benefits but would also 
result in the simultaneous increase of legal uncertainty.231 Further, the 
Blasiak’s 2019 study leaves the intriguing question of whether patents 
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are even capable of providing an effective solution to the problem at 
hand.232  
III. Towards an Effective Solution  
In using patents to maximize benefits by providing more effective 
monitoring of monetary benefits, three hindrances stand in the way of 
this goal. These hindrances included the lack of a mandatory DOO 
requirement, the exclusion of DSI from the definition of genetic 
material, and the overwhelming corporate control of MGR-based 
inventions.  
Chapter III aims to build on this analysis. First, it will address each 
of the three hindrances identified earlier. To develop an efficient, as 
well as effective, solution to the problem posed, it is essential to engage 
in both a political and academic debate. The subsequent section of this 
article brings attention to both the arguments put forth by states at 
the BBNJ and proposed solutions within academic discourse. Then, a 
novel solution to the problem is proposed—effectively solving the 
problem of legal status and equitable distribution.  
A. Mandatory Disclosure of Origin Requirement 
As identified in the previous chapter, a mandatory DOO 
requirement should be put in place to monitor compliance with the 
applicable ABS regime. However, the political opinion surrounding this 
issue is split.233 The user and provider States, generally the Global 
North and South respectively, disagree on the inclusion of DOO 
requirements for patent applications.234 Those in favor of including this 
requirement, particularly the Global South, argue that it will reduce 
the incidence of patents that should not have been granted because the 
subject matter lacks novelty or is too obvious.235 The grant of such 
erroneous patents can create barriers preventing access to foreign 
markets for products from provider countries.236 On the other hand, 
user countries have resisted a binding agreement or wanted to employ 
only defensive measures, such as traditional knowledge databases, to 
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avoid the grant of erroneous patents and the facilitation of ABS.237 
They claim that a mandatory genetic resources DOO requirement 
would be unworkable as it would reduce legal certainty and place too 
much of a burden on patent applicants, resulting in diminished 
innovation.238 The reasoning of countries on either side stems from their 
pre-existing national laws.239 
At the international fora, Council for TRIPS and the Conference of 
Parties for the CBD discussed these requirements a number of times.240 
Recognizing the call for DOO requirements, the WTO Secretariat 
considered the suggestion that it should be made a requirement for the 
grant of a patent under Article 27.3(b) or Article 29 of TRIPS.241 
However, the Secretariat thought that these provisions were not 
intended to further the benefit-sharing objective of the CBD, which 
instead would be better served by contractual solutions between specific 
parties.242 In the Conference of the Parties VI (“COP-VI”) of the CBD, 
Decision VI/24 on Access and Benefit Sharing as Related to Genetic 
Resources was adopted,243 which encouraged the disclosure of the 
country of origin per the Bonn Guidelines.244 However, at the June 2017 
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee, it was proposed that the MGRs 
found in the ABNJ should be excluded from the mandatory 
requirement245 as an ABS framework under the CBD was yet to be 
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agreed upon.246 The discussion has not progressed much in the two years 
that have followed.247 The fundamental issue that has led to this 
impasse is the question of whether these legal requirements would 
enable disclosure as such, or act as an effective prohibition on securing 
patents if certain preconditions go unmet.248  
There has been much academic engagement with this fundamental 
issue. For example, Feng outlines the legal implications of either 
possibility.249 If the requirements were to enable disclosure, then that 
could be pursued under Article 22 and Article 29 of the TRIPS.250 On 
the other hand, if this requirement had to act as an effective 
prohibition, then that could be pursued under the Nagoya Protocol 
which allows for checkpoints.251  
Conducting a similar analysis, Arnaud-Haond suggests that an 
effort from the WTO requiring geographic and taxonomic origin of 
resources associated with a patent under TRIPS would help support 
the CBD regime, which is not a legally binding instrument.252 Similarly, 
Blakeney proposes that disclosure requirements be included as a 
condition of patentability to increase its stringency and thereby the 
benefits of the ABS framework.253 Therefore, there seems to be a 
collective consensus within academia that the present legal 
requirements of disclosure within the TRIPS can simply be extended to 
require the DOO requirements.254  
Given the availability of such a simple legal implication, the lack 
of political consensus on the matter indicates that the solution for this 
issue does not lie within patent law. As the instrument and any ABS 
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regime it formulates will only be effective if it is signed by user and 
provider countries, it is advisable to consider an alternate solution.  
B. Inclusion of Digital Sequence Information  
As discussed in Section II, open access DSI is excluded from the 
definition of genetic resources under Article 2 of the CBD.255 It was 
noted that including this within the definition would increase the 
benefits to the ABS regime because it would require user states to pay 
provider states for the resources used.256 Further, non-monetary benefits 
would also increase as DSI contains information that would not 
ordinarily be available by making available tangible genetic material.257 
However, our understanding of what DSI is still vastly incomplete. 
A “Scoping Study” on DSI was conducted in January of 2018 by the 
CBD to gather knowledge on what DSI consists of and the concerns it 
would trigger if it were included within the convention.258 At this 
nascent stage, there has not been much political engagement on the 
matter.259 So, it would be more appropriate to consult the opinions of 
industrial stakeholders. 
However, industrial stakeholders are vehemently opposed to the 
inclusion of DSI within the Nagoya Protocol.260 The International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) believes that the availability of DSI 
encourages innovation through natural product research, stimulates 
scientific collaboration, and promotes publications.261 Such exchange is 
essential to achieve the objectives defined in Article 12 of the CBD, 
namely to promote and cooperate in scientific advances, and to develop 
programs for scientific and technical education, among others.262 On a 
similar vein, the League of European Universities (“LERU”) argues that 
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requiring the inclusion of DSI will add to the complexity of the Nagoya 
Protocol, which is already burdensome for universities.263 Further, 
universities conduct both commercial and non-commercial research; as 
the Nagoya Protocol does not make a distinction between the two,264 
similar limitations will apply to purely curiosity-driven research and 
thus curb innovation. 
On the other hand, academics such as Jefferson and Thambisetty 
have argued that, by requiring the inclusion of open-access genetic 
material, the material would be termed “prior art.”265 This would then 
lead to the failure of fulfilling the novelty requirement of 
patentability.266 Therefore, such material would be easily patentable by 
others such as corporate entities. Without the protection of DSI being 
treated as genetic resources under the Nagoya Protocol, there is a very 
real possibility that it will end up in corporate control.267  
Although the corporate control of such DSI is worrisome, the valid 
and vehement opposition to its inclusion within the Nagoya Protocol 
by stakeholders demonstrates that regulation of open-access patents is 
not the solution.  
C. Overwhelming Corporate Control  
The overwhelming corporate control of inventions derived from 
MGRs was unearthed by a study from Blasiak in 2017.268 Further, as 
discussed above, publicly available databases have led academics to fear 
that corporate entities could patent this open access data.269  
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An interesting point put forth by Thambisetty is that corporations 
tend to have low thresholds for legal uncertainty.270 Legal rights to 
MGRs within the ABNJ tend to be far more certain as they remain 
unregulated by the Nagoya Protocol.271 This certainty makes these 
resources far more viable avenues of investment to corporations.272  
If this led to the grant of many patents, as it is likely to, it will 
amount to the fragmentation of rights and the private appropriation of 
an area that is to be treated as CHM. Even if the CHM principle does 
not apply to these resources, academics believe that appropriation must 
still be avoided.273 The fragmentation of rights could lead to the 
“tragedy of the anti-commons” or patent thickets where the private 
appropriation of biotechnological genes could lead to the 
underutilization of the resources.274 This could hinder innovation rather 
than promote it.275 Moreover, scientific innovations developed from 
these patented genetic material will almost certainly be inaccessible to 
poorer populations. For this reason privately owned patents on genetic 
material and information is not compatible with the idea of good 
governance of MGR from ABNJ nor is it in the best interests of all 
mankind.  
Given the numerous incentives for patents on genetic resources,276 
and the limited number of entities who have the capacity to prospect 
on the high seas,277 this is a problem that needs to be resolved urgently. 
However, due to the exclusive rights granted by patents,278 it might be 
wise to consider an alternative approach to reach a timely and viable 
solution.  
Therefore, none of the three hindrances to the achievement of 
framing an efficient ABS regime can be effectively overcome through 
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the patent system. Although academics agree that the imposition of a 
mandatory DOO requirement would naturally extend from the existing 
disclosure requirements, there is a lack of political consensus in this 
regard.279 Second, regarding the inclusion of DSI within the Nagoya 
Protocol, this would lead to the realization of greater benefits by 
requiring users to pay providers for access to information. But 
stakeholders are opposed to this proposal because it would increase legal 
uncertainty and create a more tedious ABS regime.280 Finally, the very 
nature of patents gives rise to the issue of overwhelming corporate 
control. Keeping this in mind, in the final section of this paper I propose 
a possible alternative solution. 
D. Alternative Solution 
Although patents may be able to maximize or monitor monetary 
benefits, they may not be the most effective solution given the lack of 
political and stakeholder consensus. Academics agree that, regardless of 
MGRs within ABNJ being classified as CHM, the area constitutes a 
public domain whose management can only be considered effective 
when not privately appropriated by any one party.281 “Rather, the 
system should be based on cooperative actions and accessibility to the 
outcomes of innovation.”282  
One thing that the solutions above failed to consider is the political 
tensions and what the most realistic option would be. The deadlocks 
identified in Chapter II will not effectively be solved by the solutions 
analyzed in Section III because States, who have been identified as the 
main stakeholders at the BBNJ,283 will still negotiate with their vested 
interests in mind. These must be considered alongside free-market 
principles so that the 1994 Implementation Agreement 
(“Implementation Agreement”) is signed by developing as well as 
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developed states. If not, then a similar situation that brought the 
Implementation Agreement will be reached.284 
However, an emerging new method of management of the public 
domain has recently emerged with free market principles at its heart.285 
This is the principle termed “nondominium”286 and it requires due 
consideration as an effective alternative solution. 
1. Application of Nondominium to ABNJ 
Nondominium was coined by Chris Cook as a concept much like 
regional stewardship or trusteeship.287 As a principle, nondominium is 
an agreement which brings the stakeholders together—either jointly or 
collectively—to hold land in common, but also enables them severally 
and individually to share the rights and obligations as they may 
consensually agree.288 It places economic development at its heart.289  
Simply put, the user of the land pays a rental in money or kind and 
a proportion of this flow of value is allocated to a group of stakeholders 
that introduce the occupiers and investors, among other things, as a 
service.290 In designing the regime, the stakeholder’s interests are in line 
with that of any investors who participate within the system.291 The 
stakeholders are not themselves entitled to any dominant rights; 
however, they possess certain veto rights within the agreement.292 
Essentially this results in “a cooperative of cooperatives,” in the words 
of Cook.293 Although the occupier, investor and manager can all change, 
the land in itself can never be bought or sold and will remain in 
perpetuity as a nondominium.294 
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This principle was applied to the ocean and its resources by Laister 
and Faizer.295 According to Laister and Faizer, a trustee for the CHM 
would represent a group of beneficiaries and oversee the legal operation 
of the common area.296 Meanwhile, a manager would also be appointed, 
to help them identify opportunities for advancement of the common 
pool of resources per a transparent formula for revenue sharing. Each 
representative has the right to veto a resource development proposal 
put forth.  
When a formula is agreed upon, recognizing the needed inputs and 
the overall revenue sharing, the manager will arrange to open tenders 
to make potential investors and occupiers meet. This solution will 
ensure the maximizing of the economic value of the MGRs within the 
ABNJ. All the while, such tenders would remain neutral with no 
nationality or domicile and the revenue from ensuing activities would 
be distributed on a previously agreed basis. The manager also handles 
those who are noncompliant. This allows for an efficient dispute 
resolution process. In this manner, this framework as set out by the 
nondominium principle conforms to the international law requirements 
that no country or political groups could dominate.297  
2. Benefits over Current Regime  
The legal framework considered by this paper so far dealt with 
creation of an ABS framework regarding the patent system. Thus, this 
paper only considers the maximizing of the economic value and the 
incentivizing of innovation. 
The inventions derived from MGRs can be commissioned through 
tenders. To create greater economic value, this approach would help 
provide incentives at an earlier stage of the bioprospecting process as 
users pay rent and investors would be privy to the terms agreed upon. 
Further, this approach aids the advancement of science and the 
common resources while also incentivizing innovations. It allows the 
beneficiaries to enlist the help of technologically advanced countries to 
create an invention for which a need was felt. In doing so, it does not 
tie up genetic material upstream as the tenders remain neutral and 
benefits accrued will be shared in a previously agreed manner. This 
could be an effective way to deal with the problem of overwhelming 
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corporate control over patents. Rather than create exclusive rights, 
corporations would be able to negotiate the benefit-sharing mechanism.  
Further, it could be argued that the debates surrounding the DOO 
and DSI requirements, which had come to a standstill due to clashing 
interests of state parties,298 could now move forward. The DOO 
requirement will no longer be an issue as the vested interests of the 
States will have to be negotiated between the concerned parties at the 
time of the conclusion of the tender. Similarly, regarding the DSI 
requirement, the added complexity and uncertainty surrounding the 
already burdensome Nagoya Protocol299 will no longer exist.  
Therefore, the nondominium principle could potentially pave the 
way to incentivize user countries to innovate without private 
appropriation of rights through patents. Further, it also helps maximize 
economic value and share the resources in an equitable manner. Finally, 
the nondominium principle formulates an effective and probable 
solution as it considers the existing political and stakeholder conflicts.300  
IV. Conclusion  
With advancement in technology, the context surrounding the 
UNCLOS, the CBD and the TRIPS has changed. Sections I and II 
identified the regulatory gap caused by the bioprospecting of MGRs 
within ABNJ. Moreover, when significant contextual transformations 
take place, new norms emerge, old norms expire, and their 
interpretations shift. Discussing the uncertainty surrounding the legal 
status of the MGRs within the ABNJ in Section I, taking a normative 
approach to the application of Article 31 of the VCLT, it is possible 
that the old interpretation could be shifted to cover the gap in the law 
and thus achieve the objectives of the development agenda.  
Section III addressed the regulatory gap within the CBD and the 
possible relationship between the TRIPS and the CBD. The 
patentability of genetic material was briefly considered, and the 
importance of human intervention was emphasized. Then, the chapter 
continued by discussing three hindrances when linking the patent 
system to the ABS framework. These hindrances were the lack of a 
mandatory DOO requirement, the exclusion of DSI from the definition 
of genetic material, and the overwhelming corporate control of MGR-
based inventions. Discussing the political and academic misgivings to 
these three hindrances, Chapter III identified the deadlock that the 
discussions reached regarding each of these points. Although academics 
agreed that the imposition of a mandatory DOO requirement would 
naturally extend from the existing disclosure requirements, there is a 
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lack of political consensus.301 Second, regarding the inclusion of DSI 
within the Nagoya Protocol, although this would lead to the realization 
of greater benefits by requiring users to pay providers for access to 
information, stakeholders are vehemently opposed to this proposal as it 
would increase the legal uncertainty and create a more tedious ABS 
regime.302 Finally, the issue of overwhelming corporate control was 
caused by the very nature of patents, which grants exclusive rights.303 
As it emerged that the solution does not lie within the patent system, 
it became clear that the nondominium principle is the most effective 
and probable solution. 
The nondominium principle would allow for the management of the 
public domain while carrying the free market principles at its heart. 
This management method would effectively create a solution for the 
three hindrances identified above. Moreover, it would propose an 
equitable distribution of resources while maximizing economic value for 
the countries of the Global North and the South. Most importantly, it 
could potentially pave the way to incentivize user countries to innovate 
without private appropriation of rights through patent. However, it 
remains to be seen whether stakeholders prioritize innovation and 
equitable distribution over private appropriation and profit. 
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